We study the complexity of computing or approximating an equilibrium for a given finite n-player extensive form game of perfect recall (EFGPR), where n ≥ 3.
Introduction
Extensive form games are the fundamental mathematical model of games that transpire as a sequence of moves by players over time. A finite extensive form game is described by a finite tree, where each internal node belongs to one of the players (or to chance), and where each leaf indicates blowup. 7 Thus, even a P-time algorithm for NFGs requires exponential time if applied naively in this way to EFGPRs. In the other direction, an NFG can trivially be encoded as an "equivalent" EFGPR which is not much bigger, so that any equilibrium computation problem for NFGs is P-time reducible to an analogous problem for EFGPRs. In a series of important works in the 1990s, Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel [14, 40, 15 ] obtained equilibrium algorithms for 2-player EFGPRs with complexity bounds that essentially match those of 2-player NFGs. In particular, Koller and Megiddo [14] showed that for 2-player zero-sum EFGPRs an NE (i.e., a minimax profile) in behavior strategies can be computed in Ptime using linear programming. Furthermore, by using the sequence form ( [32, 40] ) of EFGPRs, Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel ([15] ) showed that one can apply variants of Lemke's algorithm to certain LCPs associated with 2-player EFGPRs to compute an (exact) NE in behavior strategies. A consequence of their result (when combined with Chen and Deng's PPAD-hardness result for 2-player NFGs [6] ) is that computing an NE for 2-player EFGPRs is PPAD-complete. Later, von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman [41] , using the sequence form, gave a similar Lemke-like algorithm for computing a "normal form perfect equilibrium" (NF-PE) 8 for 2-player EFGPRs. More recently, Miltersen and Sørensen have used the sequence form to give related Lemke-like algorithms for computing both a SE [23] and a QPE [24] for 2-player EFGPRs. As pointed out by Miltersen and Sørensen in [24] , van Damme's existence proof for a QPE in any EFGPR, given in [38] , is somewhat roundabout: it uses the existence of a proper equilibrium in a NFG ( [25] ), and it uses a relationship established in [38] between proper equilibrium in NFGs and QPEs of any EFGPR that has that NFG as its standard normal form. Miltersen and Sørensen state in [24] that "As far as we know, no very simple and direct proof of existence [of QPE] is known." They note that their results furnish a different proof of existence of QPE for 2-player EFGPRs. One of the consequences of our results is a simple and direct proof, via application of Brouwer's fixed point theorem (and Bolzano-Weierstrass), of the existence of a QPE in any n-player EFGPR. In a similar way, our results furnish a direct existence proof for all the notions of equilibrium for EFGPRs that we study.
More closely related to our complexity results for n-player EFGPRs, with n ≥ 3, von Stengel in [40] used the sequence form of EFGPRs to describe an interesting nonlinear program, associated with a given n-player EFGPR, such that the optimal solutions to the nonlinear program are the NEs of the EFGPR, where the encoding size of the nonlinear program is polynomial in the size of the EFGPR. One can use von Stengel's nonlinear programming formulation, together with results on decision procedures for the theory of reals [31, 2] , to show that approximating an NE for a given n-player EFGPR, to within given ℓ ∞ -distance δ > 0, is in PSPACE. To the best of our knowledge, this PSPACE upper bound is the best that follows from any prior work for approximating a NE (or even computing a δ-almost-NE) for n-player EFGPRs, n ≥ 3. Furthermore, we know of no similar prior upper bound for refinements of NE, such as PE or SE or QPE. In general, nonlinear programs are NP-hard to solve, so von Stengel's formulation does not by itself rule out the possibility that 7 Even notions of reduced normal form in general incur exponential blowup for EFGPRs. We will not elaborate on reduced norm form, but roughly it means redundant strategies of the EFGPR are not considered in the normal form. 8 A normal-form perfect equilibrium (NF-PE), is a (behavior) profile that induces a (mixed profile) PE of the standard NFG associated with the 2-player EFGPR. In general, this is not equivalent to (extensive form) PE for EFGPRs (see [39] , Chapter 6). In fact, unlike (extensive form) PE, a NF-PE need not even give a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the EFGPR. We will revisit the distinction between NF-PE and PE for EFGPRs when we provide formal definitions. Our results apply to both PE and NF-PE.
Also, we similarly define another continuous function, H ǫ G (x) using a "small" algebraic circuit, such that, for any fixed ǫ > 0 the function H ǫ G (x) maps the space of behavior profiles to itself, and such that every fixed point of H ǫ G (x) is a ǫ-QPE. The reason why we can construct the functions F ǫ G (x) and H ǫ G (x) with a "small" (poly-sized) algebraic circuit is related to properties of the agent normal form of EFGPRs, and to the fact that the "realization probabilities" and the expected payoff functions for EFGPRs can be expressed as "small" (multilinear) polynomials. In particular, a simple but important fact is that an EFGPR has exactly the same (ǫ-)PEs as its agent normal form. (It does not necessarily have the same NEs.) Even though we can not construct the agent normal form explicitly (because it is exponentially large), it turns out that we do not need to: by combining these various facts, we can nevertheless construct a "small" algebraic circuit for F ǫ G (x), by adapting the analogous construction from [9] . With the functions F ǫ G (x) (and H ǫ G (x)) in hand, in Section 4 we then use (similar to [9] ) algebraic circuits to construct a "very very small" ǫ * > 0 for which we can prove, using results from real algebraic geometry ( [31, 2] ), that every fixed point of F ǫ * G (x) is δ-close (in ℓ ∞ ) to an actual PE. Likewise, we show that every fixed point of H ǫ * G (x) is δ-close to a QPE. This allows us to show containment in FIXP a for approximating a PE, and for approximating a QPE. We furthermore show how to extend the function F ǫ G (x) to define another "small" algebraic function G ǫ G (x, z) that serves the same purpose for sequential equilibrium (SE), and in particular that additionally includes a corresponding system of beliefs inside its fixed points. This shows containment in FIXP a for approximating an SE.
Finally, in Section 5, we observe some properties of the functions F ǫ G (x) (they are "polynomially continuous" and "polynomially computable"), which when combined with results in [10] imply that computing a "δ-almost fixed point" of F ǫ G (x), given G and given δ > 0 and ǫ > 0, is in PPAD. We then show that a "δ-almost fixed point" of F ǫ G (x) is a (3δ)-almost-(δ + ǫ)-PE of G. We also show that a "δ-almost fixed point" of H ǫ G (x) is a (3δ)-almost-(δ + ǫ)-QPE. Lastly, we show that a δ ′ -almost-ǫ ′ -PE, for "polynomially small" δ ′ and ǫ ′ , is a δ-almost-SGPE of G. These results allow us to show containment in PPAD for the "δ-almost" equilibrium notions that we study.
This last part, for establishing PPAD-completeness for "δ-almost" equilibria, is technically the most involved part of our proofs. Another technically novel part of our proofs is showing FIXP acompleteness for computing a QPE, which involves a novel fixed point characterization. By comparison, our proofs of FIXP a -completeness for NE, SGPE, and PE are technically "easy" given the prior results in [9, 10] : the key new task is to just "connect the dots" between a number of results that have long existed in the literature on EFGPRs, and to realize that, fortuitously, these fit together "perfectly" with the new fixed point functions for (refined) equilibria of normal form games, developed recently in [9, 10] .
It is interesting to remark that, the way our results work, we would not know how to approximate an NE for an n-player EFGPR in FIXP a , without at the same time actually approximating a PE (or QPE). So, considering Selten's more refined notion of PE has actually "helped" us computationally.
Potential computational applications. It is noteworthy that our results could potentially provide the first "reasonably practical" method for computing a δ-almost (Nash, subgame-perfect, ǫ-perfect, or ǫ-quasi-perfect) equilibrium for an n-player EFGPR, by applying classic discrete path following algorithms for "almost" fixed point computation, such as variants of Scarf's algorithm [33, 34] , on the "small" algebraic fixed point functions we associate with EFGPRs. We believe this is a promising approach for "almost equilibrium" computation for EFGPRs that should be implemented and explored experimentally. We note that the well-known software package GAMBIT ( [20] ), which provides a variety of state-of-the-art algorithms for solving various classes of games, does not currently provide any algorithm for computing or approximating an equilibrium (of any kind) for a general n-player EFGPR, for any n ≥ 3. Indeed, a survey on equilibrium computation from 1996 ( [21] ), by McKelvey and McLennan who helped to develop GAMBIT, discusses the algorithms by Koller et. al. ([14, 40, 15] ) for 2-player EFGPRs, but does not discuss any general algorithms for n-player EFGPRs, beyond first converting to (reduced) normal form, and using heuristics like iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We believe our results can potentially be used to remedy this gap in the availability of "practical" software for equilibrium computation for n-player EFGPRs.
Definitions and Background
Dear Reader: EFGPRs, and refinements of equilibrium for them, are treated in nearly every modern textbook on game theory (see, e.g., [19, 28, 26, 39] ). Nevertheless, for us to discuss our problems rigorously, we can not just point you to a book or paper with relevant definitions. We must fix (a considerable amount of) notation and terminology, and we must describe various essential background results. This is especially because we will be addressing various subtle refinements of equilibrium, and corresponding notions (in some cases, new) of "approximate" and "almost" equilibrium, where slight differences in definitions can have major consequences, particularly for computational complexity. We also have to define the relevant complexity classes like FIXP, FIXP a , and PPAD. So, we proceed to carefully fix notation and definitions, and to describe the needed background results. Readers familiar with EFGPRs, or with other parts of the background, can skip ahead to subsequent sections that contain the new results, and return to this section as needed, using it as a "reference". (Although some things are likely to become harder to follow that way.)
For a finite set X, we let ∆(X) denote the set of probability distributions on X, i.e., the set of functions f : X → [0, 1] such that x∈X f (x) = 1. For f ∈ ∆(X), we let support(f ) = {x ∈ X | f (x) > 0} denote its support set. For a positive integer k, we let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. Extensive Form Games. Intuitively, a finite game tree is just a rooted, labeled, finite tree. We will find it convenient to view such a tree as a finite, prefix-closed, set of strings over a finite alphabet of "actions". Formally, let Σ be a finite set called the action alphabet. We shall use the symbols a, a ′ , a 1 , a 2 , . . ., to denote letters in the alphabet Σ. For a string u ∈ Σ * , we use |u| to denote the length of u. A tree, T = (V, E) over action alphabet Σ, consists of a finite set V ⊆ Σ * of nodes (or vertices), where furthermore V is prefix-closed, meaning that if w ∈ V and w = ua, where a ∈ Σ, then u ∈ V . Note that by definition the empty string ǫ is in V . We refer to ǫ as the root of the tree. The directed edge relation E ⊆ V × V , of the tree T (which points "away from" the root) is defined by: E = {(u, w) ∈ V × V | ∃a ∈ Σ : w = ua}. For two nodes u, w ∈ V , if (u, w) ∈ E, we say that w is a child of u, and that u is the (unique) parent of w. For u ∈ V , we let Ch(u) = {w ∈ V | (u, w) ∈ E} denote the set of children of u. Let ⊑ denote the reflexive transitive closure of E. Thus, u ⊑ w is just the prefix relation on the set V . We use u ⊏ w to denote the strict prefix relation: (u ⊑ w ∧ u = w). When u ⊏ w, we say that u is a ancestor of w, and that w is a descendant of u. For each node u ∈ V , we define Act(u) = {a ∈ Σ | ua ∈ V } to be the set of actions available at node u. A leaf is a node u ∈ V with no children, i.e., where Ch(u) = ∅. Let L = {u ∈ V | Ch(u) = ∅} denote the set of leaves of the tree T . A non-leaf node is called an internal node; let W = V \ L denote the set of internal nodes. A path ψ in the tree T is a non-empty sequence ψ = u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u m of nodes, where for all 0 ≤ i < m, (u i , u i+1 ) ∈ E. The path ψ is called a play if u 0 = ǫ, and it is called a complete play if additionally u m is a leaf. In other words, a (complete) play is just a path that starts at the root (and ends at a leaf). Note that a node u ∈ V is a string in Σ * that encodes all the information needed to reconstruct the unique path in T from the root to u.
A Finite Game in Extensive Form (EFG), G = (N, Σ, T, P, I, p, r), is a tuple consisting of:
. . , n} of players.
2.
Action alphabet: a finite set Σ, called the action alphabet. Let k G = |Σ| denote the size of Σ.
3.
Game Tree: A finite tree T = (V, E) over the action alphabet Σ, called the game tree.
4.
Player partition: A partition P = (P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P n ) of the set W of internal nodes, i.e., P i ⊆ W, n k=0 P k = W, and P i ∩ P j = ∅, for all i = j, i, j ∈ {0, . . . , n}. For i = 1, . . . , n, the nodes in P i are the internal nodes "belonging" to player i: these are the nodes where player i has to choose the next move. The set P 0 consists of the internal nodes belonging to chance (or nature). The next move at a node u ∈ P 0 is chosen randomly, according to a provided distribution, p u , given in item (6.) below. We define the player map, P : V → N, by: for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and u ∈ P i , P(u) := i.
Information set partition:
is a partition of the set P i of vertices belonging to player i, where each
It is furthermore assumed that, for every information set I i,j , and for any two nodes u, v ∈ I i,j , Act(u) = Act(v). In other words, the same set of actions is available to player i at every node in I i,j . Let A i,j := Act(u), where u ∈ I i,j . By assumption, A i,j is well-defined.
We define the map I(·), which maps a node u to the index of the information set to which u belongs. Thus, if u ∈ I i,j , then I(u) := j. For convenience, we extend the map I(·) to chance nodes u ∈ P 0 as follows: for all u ∈ P 0 , we define I(u) := u.
The extensive form game, G, is said to have perfect information if all information sets I i,j are singleton sets, for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d i ]. Otherwise, it is called a game of imperfect information.
Probability distributions for chance nodes:
A tuple of probability distributions p = (p u ) u∈P 0 , one for each chance node u ∈ P 0 , where p u : Act(u) → (0, 1] ∩ Q is a positive, rational 9 , probability distribution on actions available at u. So, p u (a) > 0 and p u (a) ∈ Q for all a ∈ Act(u), and a∈Act(u) p u (a) = 1. Let p G 0,min := min u∈P 0 ,a∈Act(u) p u (a).
Payoff functions:
An n-tuple r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) of payoff functions. For each player i, the payoff function r i : L → N >0 , maps each leaf u ∈ L of the tree T to a positive integer payoff for player i. 10 Let M G := max i∈[n],u∈L r i (u) denote the largest possible (positive integer) payoff.
We denote the bit encoding size of an EFG, G, by |G|, where we assume binary encoding for the integer payoff values at the leaves of G, as well as the rational probabilities of actions at chance nodes (with numerator and denominator given in binary). 11 For a rational number q ∈ Q, we use size(q) to denote its bit encoding size. Similarly, for a rational vector v ∈ Q m , we use size(v) := m i=1 size(v i ) to denote its encoding size. For a game G with tree T = (V, E), let h G := max{|u| | v ∈ V } denote the height of T . For u ∈ V , we define the subtree rooted at u, T u = (V u , E u , u), by: V u = {w ∈ V | u ⊑ w}, and
Consider an EFG, G = (N, Σ, T, P, I, p, r). For a node u of the game tree T , if the subtree T u satisfies the property that for every node w ∈ V u , the information set I P(w),I(w) is a subset of V u , then the subtree T u naturally defines a subgame, G u = (N ′ , Σ, T ′ , P ′ , I ′ , p ′ , r ′ ), which is rooted at the node u instead of at ǫ, and where the player partition, information set partition, payoff functions, and probability function for chance nodes, are all inherited directly from G by restricting them to the subtree T u in the obvious way.
Note that a node u ∈ V is a string in Σ * which also encodes the unique history of actions, starting at the root, which lead to that node in T . For any node u ∈ V , with |u| = k, u = a 1 a 2 . . . a k , and for any m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, let u[m] = a 1 . . . a m denote the length m prefix of u. For a node u, with |u| = k, we define the information-action history at u, denoted Y (u), to be the following sequence of k triples:
For each player i ∈ [n], we define the visible history for player i at u, denoted Y i (u), to be the subsequence of Y (u) obtained by retaining only those triples (i ′ , j ′ , a ′ ) in the sequence Y (u) for which i ′ = i, and deleting all other triples. In other words, Y i (u) records the sequence of information sets belonging to player i encountered along the path from the root ǫ to u (not including u), and the actions player i chose at each of those information sets, prior to reaching u. An EFG, G, is said to have perfect recall if the following condition holds: for any two nodes
In other words, during play, players remember their own prior sequence of actions as well as the information sets they were in when they took those prior actions. So, it can not be the case that two nodes u and v are in the same information set for some player i, and yet the visible history for player i at u is different from the visible history for player i at v. Note that perfect recall implies there do not exist nodes u = v belonging to the same information set such that u is an ancestor of v. Otherwise, since Y i (u) is a strict prefix of Y i (v), we would have Y i (u) = Y i (v), violating perfect recall. For a game G of perfect recall, let us define the visible history associated with an information set I i,j as follow: Let Y i,j := Y i (u), where u ∈ I i,j . Note that by perfect recall Y i,j is well-defined.
Assumption: Throughout this paper, extensive form games are assumed to have perfect recall.
As mentioned, this assumption is standard practice in much of the literature on extensive form games. As mentioned, we use EFGPR to refer to an EFG with perfect recall.
Strategies.
For an extensive form game, G, where the information sets for player i are indexed add a large enough positive value to the resulting integers to get positive payoffs. This does not increase by much the encoding size of G, and the resulting game can be shown to be "suitably isomorphic" to the original for all our purposes, including equilibrium approximation within desired precision, and δ-almost equilibrium computation. 11 We assume natural representations for the various pieces of G, including the tree T , player partition, information partition, payoff functions, and the probability distributions at chance nodes (with rational probabilities encoded in binary) . The details of the natural encoding are irrelevant for our purposes, so we do not spell them out.
that assigns an available action to each information set belonging to player i, so for all j ∈ [d i ], s i (j) ∈ A i,j . In other words, when using pure strategy s i , player i chooses the available action s i (j) at every node in the information set I i,j . Let S i denote the set of pure strategies for player i. Let S = S 1 × S 2 × . . . × S n denote the set of profiles of pure strategies.
A mixed strategy for player i, σ i ∈ ∆(S i ), is a probability distribution on pure strategies S i (note: for a finite game G, S i is a finite set). For a pure strategy c ∈ S i , we shall use π c i to denote this pure strategy as an element of ∆(S i ); so π c i (c) = 1, and π c i assigns probability 0 to other pure strategies. We let M i = ∆(S i ) denote the set of mixed strategies for player i.
denote the set of profiles of mixed strategies. Let M >0 denote the set of fully mixed profiles of mixed strategies, that is,
is a probability distribution on the set of actions A i,j available in information set I i,j . In other words, for all a ∈ A i,j , 0 ≤ b i,j (a) ≤ 1, and ( a∈A i,j b i,j (a)) = 1. We shall find it convenient to sometimes write b i,j,a instead of b i,j (a), and to view b i,j as a vector of probabilities,
We call b i,j ∈ B i,j a local strategy at information set I i,j . For an action a ∈ A i,j , we shall use π a i,j to denote the pure local strategy in B i,j , that assigns probability 1 to the action a.
denote the set of behavior strategies for player i. Let B = B 1 × B 2 × . . . × B n denote the set of profiles of behavior strategies. Let B >0 denote the set of fully mixed behavior profiles, that is
For a behavior strategy
consists of the same local strategies as b i , except at information set I i,j the local strategy is switched from b i,j to b ′ i,j . Likewise, for a behavior profile b ∈ B, and a behavior strategy 
. We also define a more general set of strategies, generalizing both B i and M i , called mixedbehavior strategies, M B i . A mixed-behavior strategy σ i ∈ M B i is a probability distribution over a finite subset of behavior strategies in B i . Clearly,
denote the set of profiles of mixed-behavior strategies.
Once we fix a strategy profile, σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ M B for the players, this determines a realization probability function, P σ (u), that assigns to every node u ∈ V the probability of reaching u starting from the root, when players use their respective strategies in the profile σ. Then the expected payoff, U i (σ), to player i under the strategy profile σ is:
For any profile σ, and a strategy σ ′ i for player i, we use (σ | σ ′ i ) to denote the revised profile (σ 1 , . . . , σ i−1 , σ ′ i , σ i+1 , . . . , σ n ), where everyone's strategy remains the same, except player i's strategy switches to σ ′ i . We call two strategies σ ′ i and σ ′′ i for player i realization equivalent, denoted by σ ′ i ≈ σ ′′ i , if for all u ∈ V and for all strategy profiles σ ∈ M B, 
The mixed strategy σ For a EFGPR, G, for any node u ∈ V , and any behavior profile b ∈ B, we can define the realization probability P b (u) as a multi-variate polynomial F u (x) (in fact, a multilinear monomial) whose "variables" x correspond to the coordinates of a behavior strategy profile in B, and such that for all b ∈ B, F u (b) = P b (u). Specifically, for all u ∈ V , where |u| = k and u = a 1 a 2 . . . a k , we associate the variable x i,j,a with the probability b i,j,a = b i,j (a) in a behavior profile b, and F u (x) is given by:
Note that, for any u ∈ V , the total degree of F u (x) is at most h G . More generally, for a subset
(Note: for any information set I i,j , Top(I i,j ) = I i,j .) We define the realization probability, P b (V ′ ), of (some node in) V ′ ⊆ V , under (behavior) profile b, as follows:
Thus we can also define the multilinear polynomial:
Also, using equation (1), we have that the expected payoff function is given by the polynomial:
Thus, restating all this, we have:
Proposition 2 Given a EFGPR, G, and given any subset V ′ ⊆ V of nodes of the game tree, there is a multi-variate multilinear polynomial F V ′ (x) in the vector of variables x, with total degree bounded by h G , such that for all b ∈ B, F V ′ (b) = P b (V ′ ) defines the realization probability of V ′ under behavior profile b in G. Moreover, there is a multilinear polynomial U i (x), with total degree bounded by h G , such that for all b ∈ B, U i (b) is the expected payoff of player i under behavior profile b in G, and moreover, the polynomials F V ′ (x) and U i (x) can be expressed (as a weighted sum of multilinear monomials) with an encoding size that is polynomial in |G|. 12 Of course, in general, the support size of σ b i i can be exponential in the dimension of the vector bi, so it is not in general efficient to work explicitly with σ
For a fixed b i ∈ B i , we shall use the notation U k (x | b i ) to denote the polynomial obtained by fixing the values of the variables x i , by assigning to them their corresponding values in b i , in the polynomial U k (x). Likewise, for a fixed local strategy b i,j ∈ B i,j , we shall use U k (x | b i,j ) to denote the polynomial obtained by fixing the variables x i,j by assigning to them their corresponding values in b i,j in the polynomial U k (x). Information Set Forest. We shall need the concept of the information set forest associated with each player in a EFGPR. Specifically, for a EFGPR, G, for each player i ∈ [n], we define a directed, edge-labeled, graph,
, the (indices of) information sets belonging to player i, and whose Σ-labeled directed edges, E F i ⊆ V F i × Σ × V F i , are defined as follows: (j, a, j ′ ) ∈ E F i if and only if the last triple in the (non-empty) sequence Y i,j ′ is (i, j, a). It follows immediately from this definition that F i is a directed (edge-labeled) forest, for all i. The source nodes (roots) of the forest F i are those information sets which are the first belonging to player i to be encountered along some complete play of the game G. The sink nodes (leaves) of this forest are the last information set for player i encountered along some complete play. The action a labeling the edge (j, a, j ′ ) ∈ E F i is the action that player i must take at information set I i,j in order to enable the possibility of reaching information set I i,j ′ (but whether or not this happens with positive probability can depend on the strategies of other players). We henceforth refer to F i as the information set forest associated with player i. We shall say that a node j ′ ∈ V F i is a descendant of a node j in F i if there is a path in F i from j to j ′ (in other words, if j ′ is in the subtree rooted at j).
We let h F i denote the height of the forest F i , i.e., the length of the longest path in
j denote the height of information set j in the forest F i , i.e., the length of the longest path from vertex j to a leaf of the forest F i . For a node u ∈ P i of the game tree T , we will sometimes abuse notation and use h F i u instead of h is defined as follows: if j ′ is a descendant of j in the information forest
is the profile which is identical to b for all players other than player i, and where for player i, the local strategy at information set j ′ agrees with b ′ i if the information set I i,j ′ is reachable from I i,j , and otherwise it agrees with b i .
We shall also use F i in another way to alter behavior strategies of player i. For the information set forest F i of player i, and for integer m such that 0 ≤ m ≤ h F i , let F m i denote the sub-forest of F i induced by all vertices j in F i that have height h 
to describe a profile that is identical to b, except that behavior strategy b i for player i is replaced by (
is the polynomial representing the expected payoff function to player k under a behavior profile x. For fixed b i ∈ B i , we will use the notation U k (x | (i,j) b i ) to denote the polynomial obtained from U k (x) as follows: for any j ′ ∈ [d i ], if information set I i,j ′ is reachable from information set I i,j , then the associated variables x i,j ′ are fixed to their values in the local
as follows: for every j ′ ∈ V m i , the variables x i,j ′ are fixed to their values in
), consists of a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players, a finite set S i of pure strategies for each player i, and a payoff function u i : S → N + for each player 13 i, where S = S 1 × . . . × S n . For every finite n-player EFG(PR), G, there is an associated standard normal form game,
, where the set of pure strategies S i for player i in N (G) is the set of pure strategies for player i in G, and where the payoff function, u i (·), for each player i is defined by u i (s) := U i (s) for all s ∈ S, where U i (s) is the expected payoff in G to player i under pure profile s. For NFGs we use the same notations (σ i , σ, U i (σ), etc.) for mixed strategies, mixed profiles, and their expected payoffs, etc., as we do for EFGPRs. Note that the encoding size |N (G)| of the NFG N (G) is in general exponential in |G|, because already when there are two actions available at each information set, the number of strategies |S i | of player i is 2 d i , where d i is the number of information sets belonging to player i.
In the other direction, we can easily convert any NFG Γ = (N,
to an "equivalent" EFGPR, E(Γ), which is not much bigger in terms of encoding size than Γ. Specifically, let the action alphabet Σ of E(Γ) be the disjoint union of pure strategies of Γ, Σ =˙ n i=1 S i , and let the nodes V of the game tree of E(Γ)
The player partition is given as follows: P 0 = ∅ and for all i ∈ [n]:
There is only one information set for each player i ∈ [n]: namely I i,1 := P i . Finally, the leaves are the nodes L := {u ∈ V | |u| = n}, and the payoff functions r i are defined as follows, for all i ∈ [n]: for any leaf
Note that E(Γ) clearly has perfect recall since "there is nothing to remember": for any player i ∈ [n] and any nodes u, v ∈ P i , the visible histories Y i (u) and Y i (v) are both the empty sequences, and thus equal, because there is no ancestor of u or v belonging to P i . The encoding size of E(Γ) is certainly polynomial in the encoding size of Γ (and with judicious encoding of the various parts of E(Γ) it could be made essentially linear). It is not hard to see that the games Γ and E(Γ) are essentially "equivalent" in every respect that matters to us (including for computational purposes). Note, in particular, that there is a one-to-one correspondence, which respects payoffs, between the mixed strategies of Γ and the behavior strategies of E(Γ).
Equilibrium. For a NFG, Γ = (N, (S
is a best response to σ if and only if, for every pure strategy c ∈ support(σ ′ i ), and for every strategy
A mixed profile σ is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) for Γ if σ i is a best response to σ for all i. Nash [27] showed every (finite) NFG has an NE. It follows that the standard normal form game N (G) associated with an EFGPR, G, has a mixed NE, σ * ∈ M , which by definition is also a mixed Nash equilibrium of G. We can say more. In light of Proposition 1, a behavior strategy
is call a Nash equilibrium (NE) in behavior strategies if for all players i, b i is a best response to b. Combining Proposition 1 and Nash's theorem applied to the standard normal form N (G), it follows that a NE in behavior strategies exists for any EFGPR, G.
A profile b ∈ B is called a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SGPE) if b induces a Nash equilibrium on every subgame G u of G. In other words, for every subgame G u , if we confine the behavior profile b to the subtree T u rooted at u, it induces a Nash equilibrium b u for the subgame G u . Again, a SGPE in behavior strategies exists for any EFGPR [35] , and of course subgame-perfection is a refinement of NE: the SGPEs form a subset of the NEs.
We now discuss several notions of "approximate" and "almost" equilibrium for normal form and extensive form games. The well known notion of a "ǫ-NE" for a NFG is a profile where, informally, no player can improve its own payoff by more than ǫ by switching its strategy unilaterally. This of course can be defined analogously for EFGs and EFGPRs. However, to avoid confusion in terminology between this notion and the very different notion (introduced by Myerson [25] ) of ǫ-perfect equilibrium (ǫ-PE), which we define shortly, we will use the different terminology "δ-almost-NE" to refer to what would usually be called a "δ-NE" in the literature.
Formally, for δ > 0, we call a behavior strategy
we define a δ-almost subgame-perfect equilibrium (δ-almost-SGPE), to be a profile b ∈ B which induces a δ-almost-NE, b u , on every subgame G u of G. Note that "δ-almost-SGPE" is a refinement of "δ-almost-NE".
As mentioned, Selten [36] pointed out that SGPE has inadequacies as a refinement of NE. For this reason, Selten defined a more refined notion of perfect equilibrium, based on "trembling hand" perfection. Two distinct notions emerge from this: normal form perfect equilibrium (NF-PE) and extensive form perfect equilibrium (PE). We shall find it very useful to provide Myerson's [25] alternative definitions for these notions, going via the notion of "ǫ-perfect equilibrium". Myerson originally defined ǫ-PE for NFGs, but his definition adapts readily to EFGPRs (see, e.g., [39, 38] 
, and for ǫ > 0, a mixed profile σ ∈ M is called a ǫ-perfect equilibrium (ǫ-PE) of Γ if it is both (a): fully mixed meaning σ ∈ M >0 , and (b): for every player i and pure strategy c ∈ S i , if σ i (c) > ǫ, then the pure strategy π c i is a best response for player i to σ, in other words,
Likewise, we call σ a δ-almost ǫ-perfect equilibrium (δ-almost-ǫ-PE) of Γ if (a) holds and, instead of condition (b), σ satisfies the following condition (b ′ ): for every player i and pure strategy c ∈ S i , if σ i (c) > ǫ, then the pure strategy π c i is a δ-almost best response for player i to σ, in other words,
We call a mixed profile σ * , a (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium (PE) of Γ if it is a limit point of a sequence of ǫ-PEs of Γ (with ǫ → 0). In other words, σ * is a PE iff there is a sequence ǫ k > 0, k ∈ N, such that lim k→∞ ǫ k = 0, and such that for all k ∈ N there is an ǫ k -PE, σ ǫ k of Γ, with lim k→∞ σ ǫ k = σ * . Every NFG, Γ, has a PE, and every PE is both a NE and a SGPE ( [36] ).
For a EFGPR, G, a local strategy
is a δ-almost local best response to b if and only if for all actions a ∈ A i,j ,
For an EFGPR, G, and for ǫ > 0, a behavior profile b ∈ B is called a ǫ-perfect equilibrium (ǫ-PE), if it is (a): fully mixed, meaning b ∈ B >0 , and (b): for all i, j, and all a ∈ A i,j , if b i,j (a) > ǫ, then π a i,j is a local best response to b. It other words, if a local strategy b i,j places probability greater than ǫ on action a, then unilaterally switching the local strategy b i,j to pure action a is a local best response to b.
For δ > 0, and ǫ > 0, a behavior profile b ∈ B is called a δ-almost ǫ-perfect equilibrium (δ-almost-ǫ-PE) of G, if it is (a.): fully mixed, b ∈ B >0 , and (b.): for all i, j, and all a ∈ A i,j if b i,j (a) > ǫ, then π a i,j is a δ-almost local best response to b. We call a behavior profile b * ∈ B a extensive form perfect equilibrium (PE) of G if it is a limit point of ǫ-PEs of G (where ǫ → 0). Selten [36] showed that every EFGPR, G, has a PE, and that every PE is also a SGPE of G (so, PE refines both SGPE and NE). 15 A different refinement of equilibrium for a EFGPR, G, is a normal form perfect equilibrium (NF-PE). This is, by definition, a behavior profile b ∈ B such that the (realization equivalent) mixed profile σ[b] induced by b is a PE of the standard normal form game, N (G). We note that even a pure PE of an EFGPR, G, is not necessarily a NF-PE (i.e., does not necessarily induce a PE of N (G))), and nor is a pure NF-PE (i.e., a pure PE of N (G)) necessarily a PE of G (see [39] , Chapter 6). So, for EFGPRs, the two notions of PE and NF-PE are incompatible. In fact, a NF-PE of G is not necessarily even a SGPE (there are examples where it is not), and note that Selten's purpose for defining PE was to refine subgame-perfect equilibrium. So, it is not unreasonable to argue that PE is the more relevant notion for EFGPRs. Our results apply to approximating both a PE and a NF-PE for EFGPRs. (By contrast, the results of [41] apply only to computing NF-PE for 2-player EFGPRs.)
We next define quasi-perfect equilibrium (QPE), and the associated notions: ǫ-QPE. For an EFGPR, G, and for ǫ > 0, a behavior profile b ∈ B is called a ǫ-quasi-perfect equilibrium (ǫ-QPE), if it is (a.): fully mixed, b ∈ B >0 , and (b.): for all players i, all j ∈ [d i ], and all actions a, a
We shall delay the analogous definition of "δ-almost ǫ-quasi-perfect equilibrium" until Section 5, because it will require further definitions. ) We call a behavior profile b * ∈ B a quasi-perfect equilibrium (QPE) of G if it is a limit point of ǫ-QPEs of G (where ǫ → 0). It was shown by van Damme [38] that every EFGPR has at least one QPE. Furthermore, as noted by van Damme in [38] , QPE refines NF-PE. (We will highlight this again in Proposition 3 below. ) Finally, we define the notion of sequential equilibrium due to Kreps and Wilson [16] . We need the notion of a system of beliefs. For a EFGPR, G, with game tree T = (V, E), a system of beliefs (or belief system) is a map µ : (W \ P 0 ) → [0, 1] such that that for all players i ∈ [n] and all j ∈ [d i ], we have u∈I i,j µ(u) = 1. Let B denote the set of all belief systems (associated with the game G). An assessment is a pair (b, µ) ∈ B × B, where b is a behavior strategy profile, and µ is a belief system. Intuitively, in assessment (b, µ), for a node u ∈ I i,j , the belief µ(u) represents the probability that player i assigns to the play hitting node u assuming profile b is played, if player i finds out that the play has hit information set I i,j . For any node u ∈ I i,j , let P b (u | I i,j ) = P b (u)/P b (I i,j ) denote the conditional realization probability of reaching node u, under profile b, conditioned on reaching (i.e., realizing) information set I i,j . This is well-defined whenever P b (I i,j ) > 0.
We will call a belief system µ suitable for behavior profile b if for all information sets I i,j such that P b (I i,j ) > 0, for all nodes u ∈ I i,j , µ(u) = P b (u | I i,j ). Note that if b is a fully mixed profile then there is a unique belief system suitable for b, because P b (I i,j ) > 0 for all information sets I i,j . Accordingly, when b is a fully mixed behavior profile, we denote the unique belief system suitable for b by µ b , and we say that µ b is the belief system generated by b. Note that given an EFGPR, G, and given a fully mixed (rational) profile b ∈ B >0 , we can easily compute the belief system µ b generated by b in time polynomial in |G| + size(b), because the conditional probability
is easy to compute given G, b, and u. (By Proposition 2 the numerator and denominator are defined by multilinear polynomials, whose value can be easily evaluated at b, given G and b, in time polynomial in |G| + size(b).)
For any node u ∈ V , and for any leaf z ∈ L, let P u b (z) denote the probability that leaf z is reached if the game is started at node u and the profile b is played. For any information set I i,j , define the probability distribution P i,j b,µ (z) on leaves by:
Then the expected payoff with respect to assessment (b, µ), starting in information set I i,j , is defined by U µ,j
We say that profile b is a sequential best reply against assessment (b, µ) if for all players i, and all information sets I i,j , b i is a best reply at information set
assessments, such that for all k ∈ N, b k is fully mixed and µ b k is the belief system generated by b k , and lim k→∞ (b k , µ b k ) = (b, µ) (this conditioned is usually called consistency of (b, µ)), and furthermore b is a sequential best reply against (b, µ). Kreps and Wilson ([16] ) showed the following facts about sequential equilibrium (the facts relating QPE to SE and NF-PE were shown later by van Damme [38] ): Proposition 3 ( [16] ; [38] ) For any EFGPR, G:
([16])
For every PE, b * , of G, there is a system of beliefs µ * such that (b * , µ * ) is a SE. In this sense, we say "every PE is a sequential equilibrium". 16 In fact, for every PE, b * , of G, if (b k , µ b k ) k∈N denotes any sequence where, for all k ∈ N, b k is a fully mixed behavior profile which is a (1/k)-PE for G, and µ b k is the belief system generated by b k , and where
([38])
For every QPE, b * , of G, there is a system of beliefs µ * such that (b * , µ * ) is a SE. In this sense, we again say "every QPE is a sequential equilibrium". 17 In fact, for every QPE, b * , of G, if (b k , µ b k ) k∈N denotes any sequence where, for all k ∈ N, b k is a fully mixed behavior profile which is a (1/k)-QPE for G, µ b k is the belief system generated by b k , and where
Hasse diagram of the mentioned equilibrium refinements for EFGPRs. Figure 1 summarizes the mentioned refinement relationships between the various equilibrium notions that we have defined for EFGPRs: it depicts the Hasse diagram of the refinement partial order. In the diagram, a directed edge X → Y means that equilibrium notion Y refines notion X, i.e., that every Y -equilibrium is also a X-equilibrium. Moreover, whenever there is no directed path in this Hasse diagram from a node X to a node Y , that means there exist known examples of EFGPRs where a Y -equilibrium is not an X-equilibrium. (So, this is a partial order not because we lack knowledge of an underlying richer (total) order: no other refinement relationships exist for general EFGPRs, other than those implied by this Hasse diagram.)
It is noteworthy that there can not exist some more refined equilibrium notion that refines both PE and QPE, and exists in every EFGPR. In particular, Mertens [22] has given a simple example of a 2-player EFGPR whose set of PEs is disjoint from its set of NF-PEs (and whose NF-PEs consist of just one dominant strategy equilibrium). Thus, since QPE refines NF-PE, the set of PEs of Mertens' EFGPR is also disjoint from its set of QPEs. Mertens argues, partly based on this example, that QPE is preferable to PE as a refinement for EFGPRs: a dominant strategy equilibrium, when it exists, is generally prized, and it is always a QPE, but it is not necessarily a PE as shown by Mertens's example. Mertens's example shows we can not hope for some (as yet unknown) "most refined" notion of equilibrium for EFGPRs, which always exists, and which refines all the refinements we have mentioned. It is worth mentioning however that the results of [5] and [30] combined show that if a EFGPR is suitably "generic" 18 , then its set of PEs, QPEs, and SEs are all the same. However, many natural games that we might encounter may not be "generic" in this sense, as illustrated by the various simple and natural examples of games provided in, e.g., [39, 22, 38, 19] , where PE, SE, and QPE do not coincide. Agent Normal Form. Kuhn [17] and Selten [36] considered an alternative way to associate a normal form game with a given EFGPR, G, which they called the agent normal form. The agent 16 The converse is false: there are EFGPRs with an SE, (b ′ , µ ′ ), such that b ′ is far from any PE. See, e.g., [16, 39] . 17 The converse is again false: there are EFGPRs with an SE, (b ′ , µ ′ ), such that b ′ is far from any QPE. See [38] . 18 Here "generic" means the EFGPR has some "structure" Ψ (which excludes the payoff information) and has a vector of payoff functions r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ R m such that r ∈ R[Ψ]; where R[Ψ] ⊆ R m is a certain (semi-algebraic) "forbidden" set of dimension strictly less than m.
normal form game, AN (G), is defined as follows. AN (G) has a player, called an agent, associated with each information set I i,j of the EFGPR, G. Thus if G has n players and player i has d i information sets, then the total number of agents in AN (G) is d = n i=1 d i , which is the total number of information sets in G. We refer to each agent in AN (G) by its index: (i, j). The set of pure strategies for agent (i, j) in AN (G) is given by the set A i,j of actions available to player i of G in the information set I i,j . Thus, note that the set of mixed strategies for agent (i, j) in AN (G) is in one-to-one correspondence with the set of local strategies B i,j for player i at information set I i,j in the EFGPR, G. Thus also, the set of profiles of mixed strategies in AN (G) is in one-to-one correspondence with the set B of behavior strategy profiles in G. Moreover, the set of pure strategy profiles of the agents in AN (G) is in one-to-one correspondence with the set of pure strategy profiles S in G. Thus, hereafter, we use S interchangeably, to denote both the sets of pure profiles for G and for AN (G), and we also use B interchangeably, to denote both the set of behavior profiles of G and the set of mixed profiles of AN (G).
We define the payoff functions, u (i,j) (s), of AN (G) as follows: given a pure profile s ∈ S for the d agents, the payoff to agent (i, j) is given by u (i,j) (s) := U i (s). In other words, the payoff for every agent (i, j) in AN (G) under profile s is the expected payoff of player i in G under the same profile s. Thus, the goal of all the agents (i, j) who are "acting on behalf of" player i, is aligned exactly with the goal of player i. It follows that also the expected payoff,
A simple but important fact, that follows immediately from the definitions we have given for (ǫ-)PEs, is that the set of (ǫ-)PEs of G is equal to the set of (ǫ-)PEs of AN (G). 19 Proposition 4 (cf. [36] Lemma 7, & [25] ; see also [39] ) For a EFGPR, G, and ǫ > 0, a behavior profile b ∈ B is a ǫ-PE of G if and only if b is a mixed ǫ-PE of AN (G) (this is true by definition). Thus, a profile b ∈ B is a PE of G iff b is a PE of AN (G).
Note, firstly, that it is not true in general that the set of Nash equilibria of G and AN (G) are the same. There are simple (even 1-player) examples showing this. This is because even though a profile b ∈ B might consist entirely of "local best responses" in G, some information sets may be reached with probability 0 under profile b, and therefore "local best responses" together do not necessarily constitute a "global" best response in G.
Note also that, as mentioned already, no such relationship holds in general between the PEs of G and the PEs of its standard normal form N (G), in either direction.
Proposition 4 holds by definition because we have used Myerson's [25] alternative definition of PEs, via ǫ-PEs. We remark that the reason why Myerson's definition is equivalent to Selten's original definition (which we will not give formally) was shown already by Selten himself. Namely, Selten defined a PE as a limit point of NEs of a sequence of perturbed games (with positive "perturbations" going to zero). In a perturbed EFGPR, there is a minimum positive probability specified for each action available in each information set, and that action must be played with at least that probability in any behavior strategy. Selten ([36] , Lemma 7) showed that for perturbed EFGPRs, a behavior strategy that consists entirely of "local best responses" is also necessarily a "global" best response. As explained already, this does not hold in general when the game is not perturbed.
We shall need the following "almost" variant of Proposition 4, which also follows immediately from our definitions. 
Note that if the agent normal form AN (G) is represented in the usual way, by providing its table of payoffs for all possible pure strategy profiles of all the agents, then just as was the case for standard normal form, the encoding size |AN (G)| is also exponential in |G|, because the number |S| of pure profiles of AN (G) is exponential in |G|. Nevertheless, we shall find AN (G) very useful for our computational purposes.
The complexity classes FIXP, FIXP a , and linear-FIXP( = PPAD)
We shall now define the search problem complexity classes FIXP, FIXP a , and PPAD, which we shall use to characterize the complexity of computing an equilibrium (of various kinds) for a EFGPR.
A {+, −, * , /, max, min}-circuit has inputs consisting of variable x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , as well as rational constants, and has a finite number of (binary) computation gates taken from {+, −, * , /, max, min}, with a subset of the computation gates labeled {o 1 , o 2 , . . . , o m } and called output gates. 20 The class of {+, max}-circuits are the restricted class of {+, −, * , /, max, min}-circuits, where the only allowed gates are {+, max} in addition to gates for multiplication by a rational constant.
When a circuit in this paper is a general {+, −, * , /, max, min}-circuit, we shall often just refer to it simply as "circuit", when it is clear from the context. We shall also refer to {+, max}-circuits as piecewise-linear circuits. A circuit (of either kind) computes a continuous function from R n → R m (and Q n → Q m ) in the natural way. Abusing notation slightly, we shall often identify the circuit with the function it computes.
By a (total) multi-valued function, f , with domain A and co-domain B, we mean a function that maps each a ∈ A to a non-empty subset f (a) ⊆ B. We use f : A ։ B to denote such a function. Intuitively, when considering a multi-valued function as a computational problem, we are interested in producing just one of the elements of f (a) on input a, so we refer to f (a) as the set of allowed outputs.
A multi-valued function f : {0, 1} * ։ R * is said to be in FIXP if there is a polynomial time computable map, r, that maps each instance I ∈ {0, 1} * of f to r(I) = 1 k I , 1 d I , P I , C I , φ I , a I , b I , where
• k I and d I are positive integers.
• P I is a convex polytope in R k I , given as a set of linear inequalities with rational coefficients.
• C I is a circuit, with k I inputs and k I outputs, which maps P I to itself.
] is a finite function, given by its table.
•
The above is one of many equivalent characterizations of FIXP [10] . In particular, it was shown in [10] that the gates {+, * , max} together with rational constants suffice for functions computed by the corresponding circuits to characterize FIXP, and furthermore adding other gates such as k'th-root gates for any fixed k does not increase the power of FIXP.
A multi-valued function f : {0, 1} * ։ R * is said to be in linear-FIXP if it satisfies the same definition as for FIXP, except that the circuit C I must be a {+, max}-circuit (recall: with multiplication by rational constants allowed).
Informally, FIXP are those real vector multi-valued functions, with discrete inputs, that can be cast as Brouwer fixed point computations for algebraically defined functions, and linear-FIXP is the restriction of those to functions that are piecewise-linear. A multi-valued function f : {0, 1} * ։ R * is said to be FIXP-complete (respectively, linear-FIXP-complete) if:
1. f ∈ FIXP (respectively, f ∈ linear-FIXP), and 2. [f is FIXP-hard (respectively, f is linear-FIXP-hard)]: for all g ∈ FIXP (respectively, g ∈ linear-FIXP), there is a polynomial time computable map, mapping instances I of g to y I , 1 k I , φ I , a I , b I , where y I is an instance of f , where
In other words, for any allowed output z of f on input y I , the vector (
is an allowed output of g on input I.
In [10] it was shown that the multi-valued function which maps normal forms games, with n ≥ 3 players, to their Nash equilibria is FIXP-complete. 21 Since the output of a FIXP function consists of real-valued vectors, and since there exist circuits whose fixed points are all irrational, a FIXP function is not directly computable by a Turing machine, and the class is therefore not directly comparable with standard complexity classes of discrete total search problems (such as PPAD, PLS, or TFNP).
Even though we phrased linear-FIXP as a class of real-valued search problems, it can also be viewed as class of discrete search problems, because the nature of the functions defined by {+, max}-circuits (with multiplication by rational constants), over a convex polytope domain P I , implies that they always have at least one rational-valued fixed point, with encoding size polynomial in that of the circuit. 22 In fact, it was shown in [10] that linear-FIXP = PPAD. (So, linear-FIXP can serve as our definition of PPAD in this paper. We will not need the original definition.)
It was shown by Chen and Deng [6] that the multi-valued function that maps 2-player NFGs to their NEs is PPAD-complete, and by Daskalakis et al. [8] that the multi-valued function that maps NFGs (with any number of players), and a given rational ǫ > 0, to their ǫ-NEs is PPAD-complete.
We now define the discrete class FIXP a , also from [10] . A multi-valued function f : {0, 1} * ։ {0, 1} * (a.k.a. a totally defined discrete search problem) is said to be in FIXP a if there is a function f ′ ∈ FIXP, and polynomial time computable maps δ : {0, 1} * → Q + and g : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * , such that for all instances I, 21 To view the Nash equilibrium problem as a total multi-valued function, f Nash : {0, 1} * ։ R * , we can view all strings in {0, 1}
* as encoding some game, by viewing "ill-formed" input strings as encoding a fixed trivial game. 22 Technically, to view linear-FIXP as a discrete search problem class, comparable to PPAD, etc., we likewise close (discrete) linear-FIXP under polynomial time (search problem) reductions.
Informally, FIXP a are those totally defined discrete search problems that reduce to approximating exact Brouwer fixed points. A multi-valued function f : {0, 1} * ։ {0, 1} * is said to be FIXP acomplete if:
{0, 1} * → {0, 1} * , such that g(I) ⊇ { r 2 ( I, z ) | z ∈ f (r 1 (I)) }.
In [10] it was shown that the multi-valued function that maps pairs Γ, δ , where Γ is a NFG and δ > 0, to the set of rational δ-approximations (in ℓ ∞ -distance) of Nash equilibria of Γ, is FIXP a -complete.
3 Computing a (extensive form) ǫ-PE, and a ǫ-QPE, is in FIXP Given a EFGPR, G, we now construct an algebraically defined function, F ǫ G (x), whose Brouwer fixed points (for each fixed ǫ > 0), constitute ǫ-PEs of G. We likewise construct a function, H ǫ G (x) whose Brouwer fixed points (for each fixed ǫ > 0), constitute ǫ-QPEs of G. The functions F ǫ G (x) and H ǫ G (x) are both defined using an algebraic {+, * , max}-circuit whose encoding size is polynomial in |G|, and where ǫ > 0 is an input of the algebraic circuit. Our construction of F ǫ G (x) essentially amounts to the same construction as given for ǫ-PEs of normal form games in [9] , except when it is applied to the agent normal form, AN (G). Of course the problem is that we can not afford to actually construct AN (G), because it is exponentially large. However, it turns out we do not need to construct AN (G) in order to construct F ǫ AN (G) (x). We instead exploit the fact (Proposition 2) that the expected payoff functions U (i,j) (x) := U i (x) for agents (i, j) in AN (G) are expressible as polynomials whose encoding size is polynomial in |G|. This allows us to construct
with encoding size polynomial in |G|, avoiding the explicit construction of AN (G).
Our construction of the function H ǫ G (x) for ǫ-QPEs is based on some similar ideas, but is more involved, and does not make direct use of the relationship with AN (G).
Given a n-player EFGPR, G, the space B of behavior strategy profiles for G is clearly a compact convex polytope in euclidean space, R m , where m is the dimension of the vectors b ∈ B that denote behavior profiles. Moreover, B can clearly be expressed efficiently using a system of less than 3m linear inequalities (which define B to be the set of vectors b ∈ R m in which each local strategy b i,j forms a probability distribution on A i,j ). For ǫ > 0, let B ǫ ⊆ B denote the polytope of behavior profiles defined by:
Theorem 6 For any EFGPR, G:
There is a function, F ǫ G (x) : B → B ǫ , given by a {+, * , max}-circuit computable in polynomial time from G, with the circuit having both x and ǫ > 0 as its inputs, such that for all fixed 0 < ǫ < 1/m (where m is the dimension of vectors b ∈ B), every Brouwer fixed point of the function F ǫ G (x) is a ǫ-PE of G. In particular, the problem of computing an extensive form ǫ-perfect equilibrium for a given EFGPR is in FIXP.
There is a function, H ǫ
G (x) : B → B ǫ , given by a {+, * , max}-circuit computable in polynomial time from G, with the circuit having both x and ǫ > 0 as its inputs, such that for all fixed 0 < ǫ < 1/m (where m is the dimension of vectors b ∈ B), every Brouwer fixed point of the function H ǫ G (x) is a ǫ-QPE of G. In particular, the problem of computing a ǫ-QPE for a given EFGPR is in FIXP.
As mentioned, the proof of Part (1.) of Theorem 6 is very similar to the proof of the analogous result for ǫ-PEs of NFGs given in [9] , which itself builds on a fixed point characterization of Nash equilibria from [10] . By Proposition 4, to prove Theorem 6 it suffices to find ǫ-PEs of the agent normal form AN (G), because these are the same as ǫ-PEs of G. We can not "construct" AN (G), because it has size exponential in G, but we do not need to. We now give the detailed proof for both parts. Although the proof of Part (1.) is very similar to the analogous proof in [9] , the proof of Part (2.) also involves additional constructions and does not appeal to the relationship with AN (G). To facilitate our proof of Part (2.), we need some definitions, and an alternative characterization of ǫ-QPE.
Note that for any fully mixed profile b ∈ B >0 , for any player i, j ∈ [d i ], and any node u ∈ I i,j , the conditional probability P b (u|I i,j ) is well-defined, because P b (I i,i ) > 0. Furthermore, importantly, given that P b (I i,j ) > 0, P b (u|I i,j ) is otherwise "independent" of b i . It only depends on the behavior strategies b −i of players other than i, because, by perfect recall, for all nodes u ∈ I i,j the visible history for player i is the same: Y i,j . For b ∈ B >0 , for i ∈ [n], and for j ∈ [d i ], we use U j i (b) to denote the conditional expected payoff to player i, conditioned on reaching information set I i,j , under profile b. Again, this conditional expectation is well-defined, since b ∈ B >0 . Furthermore, again, except for the fact that P b (I i,j ) > 0, the conditional expectation U j i (b) is independent of those local strategy b i,j ′ in b i for information sets I i,j ′ such that the node j ′ ∈ V F i of the information set forest F i is not in the subtree of F i rooted at node j ∈ V F i . It only depends on those local strategies b i,j ′′ where j ′′ ∈ V F i is a node in the subtree of F i rooted at j. For i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d i ] and a ∈ A i,j , and for b ∈ B >0 , we define
Thus K j,a i (b) denotes the maximum conditional expected payoff to player i, conditioned on reaching information set I i,j using b, where player i switches to action a ∈ A i,j at I i,j , and chooses the rest of its strategy b ′ i (below information set I i,j in F i ) so as to maximize
is both well defined and "independent" of b i : it only matters that P b (I i,j ) > 0. Now, observe that, for any b ∈ B >0 , for any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d i ], and for any a, a ′ ∈ A i,j , we have:
This equivalence holds because the profiles (b
)) differ only within player i's local strategies within b i at information sets j ′ in the subtree of F i rooted at j ∈ V F i . Thus, since P b (I i,j ) > 0, the strict inequality on the left of (3) holds if and only if the strict inequality on the right of (3) holds. Thus, an alternative definition for a profile b to be a ǫ-quasi-perfect equilibrium (ǫ-QPE), is this: (a.) b ∈ B >0 , and (b.) for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d i ], and
We will exploit this alternative definition. 23 Consider a EFGPR, G, and let b ∈ B have dimension m as vectors in Euclidean space. Suppose we are given 0 < ǫ < 1/m. For a vector x of variables corresponding to the coordinates of a behavior strategy b ∈ B, we let v(x) be a m-vector such that for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d i ], and a ∈ A i,j v(x) i,j,a = U i (x | π a i,j ) = U (i,j) (x | π a i,j ). In other words, for all behavior profiles b ∈ B, v(b) i,j,a is the expected payoff to agent (i, j) in the agent normal form game AN (G), if all agents play according to b, except that agent (i, j) switches to pure strategy π a i,j . Note that by Proposition 2, v(x) i,j,a can be expressed as a polynomial in the variables x whose encoding size is polynomial in |G|.
Likewise, let us define v ′ (x) i,j,a := K j,a i (x). We shall show, in Lemma 7 below, that the function K j,a i (x), defined over B >0 , can indeed be expressed as a {+, −, * , /, max, min}-formula in the variables x, where the encoding size of the formula is polynomial in |G|.
Lemma 7 Given a EFGPR, G, for all players
, and all actions a ∈ A i,j , there is a {+, −, * , /, max}-formula v ′ (x) i,j,a (i.e., a {+, −, * , /, max, min}-circuit with no re-use of subcircuits), such that the encoding size of v ′ (x) i,j,a is polynomial in |G|, and each v ′ (x) i,j,a can be constructed from G in P-time, and such that for all fully mixed
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is that, given b ∈ B >0 , one can compute K j,a i (b) using dynamic programming, by working "bottom up" on the information set forest F i for player i. Then the key observation is that this dynamic program can actually be described by a {+, −, * , /, max}-formula which has encoding size only polynomial in G.
We next describe the dynamic program, and the resulting formula, in detail. (We will later need to use facts about the detailed structure of the formula.) Consider the information set forest F i for player i. Let L F i denote the set of leaves of F i . Let W F i denote the set of internal nodes of F i . For a node j ∈ [d i ] = V F i , and for a ∈ A i,j , let us denote the set of a-children of j in F i by: Ch a
For an internal node u ∈ W, and for a ∈ Act(u), let
In other words, L u,a denotes the set of leaves z of the game tree T that are in the subtree rooted at ua, and such that there is no node on the path from ua to z which belongs to the same player P(u) that u belongs to.
For u, v ∈ V , let P b (v | u) denote the probability that, using profile b, conditioned on reaching node u, the play eventually thereafter hits node v. For i ∈ [n] and j, j ′ ∈ [d i ], let P b (I i,j ′ | I i,j ) denote conditioned probability of reaching information set I i,j ′ , conditioned on reaching I i,j , when using profile b.
We can define v ′ (x) i,j,a := K j,a i (x) inductively in a "bottom up" fashion based on the forest F i , based on the height, h
Px(I i,j ) , is defined for all x ∈ B >0 , and by Proposition 2 both the numerator and denominator are given by polynomials in x with "small" encoding size (polynomial in |G|). Note that likewise, for a ∈ A i,j , P (x|π a i,j ) (v | u) is easily defined by a weighted monomial over the variables x whose encoding size is polynomial in |G|. Furthermore if the node j ′ ∈ V F i is a child of the node 23 Indeed, this is one of the equivalent characterizations of ǫ-QPE that was originally given by van Damme in [38] . We used a different definition for clarity, and for compatibility with the way we defined ǫ-PE. In fact, similarly van Damme [38] used a similar equivalent characterization of ǫ-PE for an EFGPR, defined as follows: (a.) b ∈ B >0 , and
, and a, a ′ ∈ Ai,j , if
Again, it is clear that this is equivalent to the definition we have given for ǫ-PE.
Thus P (x|π a i,j ) (I i,j ′ | I i,j ) is also described by a formula over the variables x with encoding size polynomial in |G|. We can now describe a dynamic program for computing K j,a i (x), for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d i ], and a ∈ A i,j :
It is clear that (4) both defines a dynamic program for computing K This can be seen by noting, firstly, that all the constituent parts of the inductively defined formula for K j,a i (x) are given by formulas with encoding size polynomial in |G|, and furthermore since the inductive definition works "bottom up" on the forest F i , there is no re-use of subformulas in this inductive definition, i.e., it indeed defines a formula, not a circuit, and the size of the formula is polynomial in |G|×|V F i | ≤ |G| 2 . (Later, in Section 5, for "almost" approximation of a QPE, we will also use the fact that the only use of division gate in this formula is in cases where the denominator evaluates to P b (I i,j ) for some information set I i,j .) Let h(x) = x+v(x), and let h ′ (x) = x+v ′ (x). For each agent (i, j), and for fixed x ∈ B, consider the function f i,j,x (t) = a∈A i,j max(h i,j,a (x) − t, ǫ). Likewise, for x ∈ B >0 , consider the function f ′ i,j,x (t) = a∈A i,j max(h ′ i,j,a (x) − t, ǫ). Clearly, both f i,j,x (t) and f ′ i,j,x (t) are continuous, piecewise linear function of t. The functions are strictly decreasing as t ranges from −∞, where f i,j,x (t) = +∞ (respectively, f ′ i,j,x (t) = +∞), up to max
Since we have |A i,j | · ǫ ≤ m · ǫ < 1, there is a unique value of t, which depends on x, call it t i,j (x) (call it, t ′ i,j (x), respectively) , where f i,j,x (t i,j (x)) = 1 (where f ′ i,j,x (t ′ i,j (x)) = 1). The functions F ǫ G : B → B ǫ and H ǫ G : B → B ǫ are defined as follows. First we define F ǫ G :
for every i = 1, . . . , n, and j ∈ [d i ], and a ∈ A i,j .
To define H ǫ G : B → B ǫ , care is needed since v ′ (x) i,j,a is only defined for x ∈ B >0 . To address this, we use an auxiliary normalizing function. For ǫ > 0, D ǫ : B → B >0 , defined as follows:
We only use D ǫ as a tool to ensure the function H ǫ G is defined for all b ∈ B. The range, and thus the fixed points, of H ǫ G lies within B ǫ , and on B ǫ the function D ǫ (x) is the trivial identity function. We define H ǫ G : B → B ǫ as follows:
for every i = 1, . . . , n, and j ∈ [d i ], and a ∈ A i,j . From our choice of t i,j (x) and t ′ i,j (D ǫ (x)), it follows that a∈A i,j F ǫ G (x) i,j,a = 1 and also that
Thus, for any behavior profile, x ∈ B, we have F ǫ G (x) ∈ B ǫ and H ǫ G (x) ∈ B ǫ . So both F ǫ G and H ǫ G indeed map B to B ǫ , and since they are clearly also continuous maps, by Brouwer's theorem, they both have a fixed point in B ǫ . 24 Lemma 8 For 0 < ǫ < 1/m:
Every fixed point of the function F ǫ
G : B → B ǫ is an ǫ-PE of AN (G), and thus also of G.
Every fixed point of the function H
Proof. The proof is essentially the same in both cases:
for all i, j, a such that x i,j,a > ǫ, and that U i (x | π a i,j ) ≤ t i,j (x) for all i, j, a such that x i,j,a = ǫ. Consequently, by definition, x constitutes an ǫ-PE.
If x is a fixed point of H ǫ
G , then x ∈ B ǫ , and thus D ǫ (x) = x. Thus, we have will
for all i, j, a such that x i,j,a > ǫ, and that K j,a i (x) ≤ t ′ i,j (x) for all i, j, a such that x i,j,a = ǫ. Consequently, by definition, x constitutes an ǫ-QPE.
The following Lemma shows that we can implement the functions F ǫ G (x) and H ǫ G (x) by a circuit which has x and ǫ as inputs, by using sorting networks.
Lemma 9 Given G, we can construct in polynomial time a {+, * , max}-circuit that computes the function F ǫ G (x), where x and ǫ > 0 are inputs to the circuit. Likewise, we can construct in P-time a {+, * , /, max}-circuit that computes the function H ǫ G (x), where x and ǫ > 0 are inputs to the circuit.
Proof.
We define the circuits for both F ǫ G (x) and H ǫ G (x) together, since they are defined very similarly. Given a vector x ∈ B, and ǫ > 0 as inputs, the respective circuits first compute y = h(x) = x + v(x), and y ′ = D ǫ (x) + v ′ (D ǫ (x)). It follows from the definition of v(x), D ǫ (x), and v ′ (x), and from Lemma 7, that both y and y ′ can be computed by a circuit using {+, * , /, max}-gates which has size polynomial in |G|. For each agent (i, j), let y i,j be the corresponding subvector of y induced by the (local) strategy of agent (i, j). Likewise, let y ′ i,j be the corresponding subvector of y ′ . Sort the vector y i,j (the vector y ′ i,j ) in decreasing order, and let z i,j (respectively, z ′ i,j ) be the resulting sorted vector, i.e. the components of z i,j = (z i,j,a 1 , . . . , z i,j,a |A i,j | ) are the same as the components of y i,j , but they are sorted (likewise for
. In other words, we are assuming
, To obtain the sorted lists z i,j and z ′ i,j , the respective circuits use a polynomial sized sorting network, for each (i, j) (see e.g. Knuth [13] for background on sorting networks). For each comparator gate of the sorting network we use a max and a min gate.
Using this, for each agent (i, j), we compute t i,j (x) and t ′ i,j (D ǫ (x)) as the following expressions:
We will show below that this expression does indeed give the correct value of t i,j (x). The proof for t ′ i,j (D ǫ (x)) is virtually identical, so we omit it. We output F ǫ G (x) i,j,a = max(y i,j,a − t i,j (x), ǫ), and
, and a ∈ A i,j .
We now have to establish that t i,j (x), defined above, is the correct value. (Again, we forgo the proof for t ′ i,j (D ǫ (x)), which is virtually identical.) Consider the function f i,j,x (t) = a∈A i,j max(z i,j,a − t, ǫ) as t decreases from z i,j,a 1 − ǫ where the function value is at its minimum of |A i,j | · ǫ, down until the function reaches the value 1. In the first interval from z i,j,a 1 − ǫ to z i,j,a 2 − ǫ the function is f i,j,x (t) = z i,j,a 1 − t + (|A i,j | − 1) · ǫ; in the second interval from z i,j,a 2 − ǫ to z i,j,a 3 − ǫ it is f i,j,x (t) = z i,j,a 1 + z i,j,a 2 − 2t + (|A i,j | − 2) · ǫ, and so forth. In general, in the l-th interval,
If the function reaches the value 1 in the l'th interval, then clearly t i,j (x) = ((
In that case, furthermore for k ′ < l, we have
, because in that case we know (z i,j,a k −t i,j (x)) ≥ ǫ for every a ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Therefore, in this case ((
On the other hand, if l < |A i,j |, then for k ′ > l we have t i ≥ z i,j,a k ′ − ǫ, i.e., z i,j,a k ′ − t i ≤ ǫ, and thus for all k ′ > l, k ′ ≤ |A i,j |, we have
Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 together immediately imply Theorem 6.
Approximating an NE, SGPE, NF-PE, SE, PE, and QPE is FIXP a -complete
In this section we exploit the algebraically defined function F ǫ G (x) and H ǫ G (x) for a EFGPR, G, with input parameter ǫ > 0, devised in the previous section for ǫ-PEs and ǫ-QPEs, and we construct a "small enough" ǫ * > 0 (using an algebraic circuit, given δ > 0) such that any fixed point of F ǫ * G (x) is a ǫ * -PE which is also δ-close to an actual PE of G (in ℓ ∞ distance), and likewise any fixed point of H ǫ * G (x) is a ǫ * -QPE which is also δ-close to an actual QPE. In this way, we show that approximating a PE, and a QPE, to within given desired precision, δ > 0, for a given EFGPR is FIXP a -complete. Since PE constitutes a refinement of NE and of SGPE, this of course immediately implies that approximating a NE or SGPE is also FIXP a -complete. Likewise, since QPE constitutes a refinement of NF-PE, this also implies that approximating a NF-PE is FIXP a -complete.
For SEs, we then also show that for any such ǫ * -PE, b ′′ , if µ b ′′ is the unique belief system generated by b ′′ then (b ′′ , µ b ′′ ) is δ-close to an actual SE of G (again in ℓ ∞ ). Furthermore, using F ǫ * G (x), we define an auxiliary fixed point function G ǫ * G (x, z) with domain B × B, such that the Brouwer fixed points of G ǫ * G are pairs (b ′′ , µ b ′′ ), where b ′′ is a ǫ * -PE and µ b ′′ is the belief system that it generates. In this way, we show that approximating a SE (including its belief system) to within given desired precision δ > 0, for a given EFGPR, is also FIXP a -complete.
Theorem 10 Given as input a EFGPR, G, and a rational δ > 0:
1. The problem of computing a vector b ′ ∈ B such that there is a PE (or NE or SGPE), b * , of G,
2. The problem of computing a vector b ′ ∈ B such that there is a QPE (or NF-PE), b * , of G,
3. The problem of computing a vector b ′ ∈ B and a belief system µ ′ such that there is a SE,
Note that FIXP a -hardness for these problems follows from the fact that we can encode any NFG, Γ, as an EFGPR, E(Γ), with not much larger encoding size, and from the fact that approximating a NE within desired precision for n-player NFGs is FIXP a -hard, as shown in [10] . The FIXP a -hardness of approximating a SGPE, PE, QPE, NF-PE, and SE, then follows because we know that these constitute refinements of NE. Thus, we only need to prove containment in FIXP a . Our proofs follow closely some of the proofs in [9] used for characterizing the complexity of approximating a PE for NFGs. Although very similar, our proof differs in some details (especially for sequential equilibrium). So, both for clarity and in order to be self-contained, we provide detailed proofs.
Before we prove Theorem 10, we need some Lemmas. The following is a special case of a general paradigm noted by Anderson [1] .
Lemma 11
For any fixed EFGPR, G, and any δ > 0, there is an ǫ > 0, so that any ǫ-(Q)PE, b ′ , of G has ℓ ∞ -distance at most δ from some (Q)PE of G, and furthermore, if µ b ′ denotes the belief system generated by b ′ , then (b ′ , µ b ′ ) has ℓ ∞ -distance at most δ from some SE of G.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there is a EFGPR, G, and a δ > 0 so that for all ǫ > 0, there is an ǫ-(Q)PE, b ǫ of G so that there is no (Q)PE in the δ-neighborhood (with respect to ℓ ∞ ) of b ǫ or that there is no SE in the δ-neighborhood (with respect to ℓ ∞ ) of (b ǫ , µ b ǫ ), where µ b ǫ is the belief system generated by b ǫ .
Consider the sequence of assessments (b 1/n , µ b 1/n ) n∈N . Since this is a sequence in a compact space (namely, the direct product of the space of behavior profiles and the space of belief systems), it has a limit point (b * , µ * ). But then b * is a (Q)PE of G, by definition, since each b 1/n is a 1/n-(Q)PE. But this contradicts the statement that there is no (Q)PE in a δ-neighborhood of any of the behavior profiles b 1/n . Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 3 (Part 3.) that (b * , µ * ) is a SE. But this contradicts the statement that there is no SE in a δ-neighborhood of any of the assessments (b 1/n , µ b 1/n ).
A priori, we have no bound on ǫ, but we can use results in real algebraic geometry [2, 3] to obtain a specific bound. We first do this for PE and SE:
Lemma 12 There is a constant c, so that for all integers n, m, k, M ∈ N and δ ∈ Q + , the following
. For any n-player EFGPR, G, with a combined total of m pure local strategies for all players in the game, with game tree T having height h G , and with M a positive integer which is at least as large as any (by assumption, necessarily positive) integer payoff of G and such that p u (a) > 1/M , for every u ∈ P 0 and every a ∈ Act(u). Then any ǫ-PE, b ǫ , of G has ℓ ∞ -distance at most δ from some PE of G, and furthermore if µ b ǫ is the belief system generated by b ǫ , then (b ǫ , µ b ǫ ) has ℓ ∞ -distance at most δ from some SE of G.
Proof.
The proof involves constructing formulas in the first order theory of real numbers, which formalize the statement of Lemma 11, with δ being "hardwired" as a constant and ǫ being the only free variable. Then, we apply quantifier elimination to these formulas. This leads to a quantifier free statement to which we can apply standard theorems bounding the size of an instantiation of the free variable ǫ making the formula true. We shall apply and refer to theorems in the monograph of Basu, Pollack and Roy [2, 3] . Note that we specifically refer to theorems and page numbers of the online edition [3] ; these are in general different from the printed edition [2] .
First-order formula for an extensive form ǫ-perfect equilibrium and for the belief system it generates: Let EPS-PE-BS(x, z, ǫ) be the quantifier-free first-order formula, with free variables x ∈ R m , z ∈ R |W\P 0 | , and ǫ ∈ R, defined by the conjunction of the following formulas, which together express the fact that x is a behavior profile that is an extensive form ǫ-PE of the given EFGPR, G, and that z is the (unique) belief system generated by x:
Note that by Proposition 2, P x (I i,j ) and P x (u) are expressible as multilinear polynomials in the variables x (whose encoding size is polynomial in |G|).
First-order formula for perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium: Let PE-SE(x, z) denote the following first-order formula with free variables x ∈ R m , and z ∈ R |W\P 0 | , expressing that x is a behavior profile this a PE of G, and that z is a belief system such that (x, z) is a SE of G:
First-order formula for "almost implies near" statement: Given a fixed δ > 0 let PE-SE-bound δ (ǫ) denote the following first-order formula with free variable ǫ ∈ R, denoting that any ǫ-perfect equilibrium, x, of G is δ-close to a PE (in ℓ 2 -distance, and therefore also in ℓ ∞ -distance), and likewise that if z is the belief system generated by x, then (x, z) is δ-close to a SE:
Suppose δ 2 = 2 −k and that M = 2 τ is a positive integer that satisfies the conditions in the statement of the Lemma. Then for this formula we have
• The total degree of all involved polynomials is at most max(2, m).
• The bitsize of coefficients is at most max(k, τ · (h G + 1)).
• The number of free variables is 1.
• Since |W\P 0 | ≤ m, converting to prenex normal form, the formula has 4 blocks of quantifiers, of sizes at most 2m, 2m, 1, 2m, respectively.
We now apply quantifier elimination [3, Algorithm 14.6, page 555] to the formula PE-SE-bound δ (ǫ), converting it into an equivalent quantifier free formula PE-SE-bound ′ δ (ǫ) with a single free variable ǫ. This is simply a Boolean formula whose atoms are sign conditions on various polynomials in ǫ. The bounds given by [3] in association with Algorithm 14.6 imply that for this formula:
• The degree of all involved polynomials (which are univariate polynomials in ǫ) is:
• The bitsize of all coefficients is at most:
By Lemma 11, we know that there exists an ǫ > 0 so that the formula PE-SE-bound ′ δ (ǫ) is true. We now apply Theorem 13.14 of [3, Page 521] to the set of polynomials that are atoms of PE-SE-bound ′ δ (ǫ) and conclude that PE-SE-bound
, where c is some fixed constant. By the semantics of the formula PE-SE-bound δ (ǫ), we also have that PE-SE-bound δ (ǫ ′ ) is true for all ǫ ′ ≤ ǫ * , and the statement of the lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 10, parts (1.) and (3.). We shall combine the proofs of parts (1.) and (3.) of the Theorem together. To do so, we shall first define an auxiliary fixed point function G ǫ G (x, z) defined in terms of F ǫ G (x), such that the Brouwer fixed points of G ǫ G are pairs (b ′′ , µ b ′′ ), where b ′′ is a ǫ-PE and µ b ′′ is the belief system that it generates. Specifically, we define
and a ∈ A i,j ; and furthermore where z ′ u :=
for all u ∈ W \ P 0 , and where u ∈ I iu,ju . Note in particular that, for all u ∈ W \ P 0 , we can express z ′ u as a (efficiently algebraically encodable) rational function of b because, recalling from Proposition 2 that for all V ′ ⊆ V , there is a efficiently encodable polynomial F V ′ (x) such that for all b ∈ B F V ′ (b) = P b (V ′ ) represents the realization probability of V ′ , we have z ′ u :=
×B is a continuous map, and notably G ǫ G is defined in the entire compact domain B × B, because b ′ := F ǫ G (b) ∈ B ǫ and thus the ratio
is always well defined (we never divide by 0, because all nodes have positive realization probability under a profile b ′ ∈ B ǫ , for all ǫ > 0). Moreover, by definition of G ǫ G , for all ǫ > 0, for any Brouwer fixed point (b ′′ , µ ′′ ) ∈ B ǫ ×B of G ǫ G , b ′′ must be a ǫ-PE of G and µ ′′ must be the unique belief system µ b ′′ generated by b ′′ . We now prove that computing a PE to within desired precision is FIXP a -complete, and that computing a SE to within desired precision is FIXP a -complete. Let G be the n-player EFGPR given as input. Let m be the combined total number of pure strategies for all players. Let M ′ be the minimum positive integer such that p u (a) > 1/M ′ , for every u ∈ P 0 and every a ∈ Act(u). Let M ∈ N be a positive integer which is the maximum of M ′ and any (by assumption, necessarily positive) integer payoff of G. By the definition of FIXP a , our task is the following. Given a parameter δ > 0, we must construct a polytope P , a circuit C : P → P , and a number δ ′ , so that a δ ′ -approximation to a fixed point of C can be efficiently transformed into δ-approximation of a PE of G, and a δ ′ -approximation of a fixed point of C can also be efficiently transformed into a δ-approximation of a SE of G. In fact, we shall let δ ′ = δ/2 and ensure that δ ′ -approximations to fixed points of C yield both a δ-approximation of a PE and a δ-approximation of a SE of G. The polytope P is simply the polytope B × B, i.e., the cartesian product of the space of behavior profiles of G and the space of belief systems; clearly we can output the inequalities defining this polytope in polynomial time. The circuit C is the following: We construct the circuit for the function G ǫ G above. Then, we construct a circuit for the number ǫ * = min(δ/2,
, where c is the constant of Lemma 12: The circuit simply repeatedly squares the number min(δ/2, M −h G ) (which is a rational constant that can be computed in P-time given the input G) and thereby consists of exactly ⌈cm 3 lg m⌉ multiplication gates, i.e., a polynomially bounded number. We then plug in the circuit for ǫ * for the parameter ǫ in the circuit for G ǫ Γ , obtaining the circuit C, which is obviously a circuit for G ǫ * Γ . Now, by the above, any fixed point (b ′′ , µ ′′ ) of C on P is an ǫ * -PE of G. Therefore, by Lemma 12, in any fixed point (b ′′ , µ ′′ ) of C, we know that b ′′ is both a ǫ * -PE and a δ/2-approximation (in ℓ ∞ -distance) to a PE b * of G, and furthermore that µ ′′ is the unique belief system generated by b ′′ , and that µ ′′ is a δ/2-approximation (in ℓ ∞ -distance) of a belief system µ * such that (b * , µ * ) is a SE of G. Finally, by the triangle inequality, any δ ′ = δ/2-approximation (b ′ , µ ′ ) to a fixed point (b ′′ , µ ′′ ) of C on P is a δ/2 + δ/2 = δ approximation (in ℓ ∞ ) of some pair (b * , µ * ), such that b * is a PE of G and (b * , µ * ) is a SE of G. We have thus established Theorem 10, parts (1.) and (3.).
Next, we want to prove something analogous to Lemma 12, but for QPEs. In order to do so, we first need the following:
, and any a, a ′ ∈ A i,j , the inequality K 
is an inequality between two {+, −, * , /, max}-formulas (over the variables x) of encoding size polynomial in |G|. We will show that any such inequality, over any subset of Euclidean space where the formula is always well-defined (i.e., involves no division by 0), can be expressed by an existential theory of reals formula whose encoding size is polynomial in the original inequality (and thus polynomial in |G|).
Specifically, suppose x is an m-vector of variables. By induction on the depth of any {+, −, * , /, max}-formula, ζ(x), which is well-defined over the domain B >0 (i.e., which involves no sub formula that performs a division by 0, when x is anywhere in that domain), we prove that there is a existential theory of reals formula Ψ ζ (y 0 , y, x), of size linear in the size of ζ, with auxiliary variable y 0 and a vector of auxiliary variables y, such that for all x ∈ B >0 , {y 0 ∈ R | ∃yΨ ζ (y 0 , y, x)} = {ζ(x)}. In other words, for the values x in the domain B >0 , the formula ∃yΨ ζ (y 0 , y, x) "expresses" a unique value, y 0 ∈ R, which is the same value as ζ(x).
The base case, when ζ(x) is a variable from x, or a rational constant, is trivial. Inductively, suppose ζ(
, where ⊙ ∈ {+, −, * , /, max}. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a formula ∃yΨ ζ 1 (y 0 , y, x) using which y 0 expresses ζ 1 (x), and which has size linear in that of ζ 1 , and likewise there is a formula ∃y ′ Ψ ζ 2 (y ′ 0 , y ′ , x) using which y ′ 0 expresses ζ 2 (x), and which has size linear in that of ζ 2 .
We construct a new formula
= min is entirely similar and symmetric to the max case. ) Note that, by induction, the new formula ∃y 0 , y ′ 0 , y, y ′ Ψ ζ (y ′′ 0 , y 0 , y ′ 0 , y, y ′ , x) again has encoding size linear in the encoding size of ζ(x), and furthermore note that the total degree of all polynomials in Ψ ζ (y ′′ 0 , y 0 , y ′ 0 , y, y ′ , x) remains 2. Finally, for x in the domain B >0 , let K j,a i (x) be expressed by ∃yΨ K j,a i (y 0 , y, x), and let
i (x) using the following existential theory of reals formula:
Lemma 14 There is a polynomial q(·), such that, for any EFGPR, G, and any δ = 2 −k > 0, where k is a positive integer, for any ǫ ≤ 1 2 2 q(|G|+k) , any ǫ-QPE of G is δ-close (in ℓ ∞ ) to a QPE.
The proof is entirely analogous to that of Lemma 12. We spell out the details for completeness.
First-order formula for ǫ-quasi-perfect equilibrium: Let EPS-QPE(x, ǫ) be the first-order formula (a universal formula in the theory of reals), with free variables x ∈ R m and ǫ ∈ R, defined by the conjunction of the following formulas, which together express the fact that x ∈ B >0 is a behavior profile that is an extensive form ǫ-QPE of the given EFGPR, G:
, and a, a ′ ∈ A i,j .
Note that by Proposition 13, Φ i,j,a,a ′ i (x) is expressible as a existential formula in the theory of reals, whose size is polynomial in |G|. Thus, the conjunction EPS-QPE(x, ǫ) of all of the above formulas is expressible as a universal formula in the theory of reals.
First-order formula for quasi-perfect equilibrium: Let QPE(x) denote the following firstorder formula with free variables x ∈ R m , expressing that x is a behavior profile that is a QPE of G:
First-order formula for "almost implies near" statement: Given a fixed δ > 0, let QPE-bound δ (ǫ) denote the following first-order formula with free variable ǫ ∈ R, denoting that any ǫ-quasi-perfect equilibrium, x, of G is δ-close to a QPE:
Suppose δ 2 = 2 −k , for some positive integer k, and let q ′ (·) be some fixed polynomial such that τ = q ′ (|G|) + k is at least the maximum encoding size of any coefficient in any of the polynomials involved in QPE-bound δ (ǫ). ( We know that such an explicit polynomial q ′ (·) exists, given the polynomial bounds as a function of G on the encoding size of the various parts of the formula QPE-bound δ (ǫ).)
• The total degree of all involved polynomials is at most 2.
• The bitsize of coefficients is at most τ .
• Converting to prenex normal form, the formula has 5 blocks of quantifiers, of sizes at most m, m, 1, m, and q ′′ (|G|), for some fixed polynomial q ′′ (·), respectively.
We now apply quantifier elimination [3, Algorithm 14.6, page 555] to the formula QPE-bound δ (ǫ), converting it into an equivalent quantifier free formula QPE-bound ′ δ (ǫ) with a single free variable ǫ. This yields Boolean formula whose atoms are sign conditions on various polynomials in ǫ. Since m ≤ |G|, the bounds given by [3] in association with Algorithm 14.6 imply that, for some fixed polynomial q ′′′ (·), we have that in this formula:
• The degree of all involved polynomials (which are univariate polynomials in ǫ) is at most 2 q ′′′ (|G|+k) .
• The bitsize of all coefficients is at most: 2 q ′′′ (|G|+k) .
By Lemma 11, we know that there exists an ǫ > 0 so that the formula QPE-bound ′ δ (ǫ) is true. We now apply Theorem 13.14 of [3, Page 521 ] to the set of polynomials that are atoms of QPE-bound ′ δ (ǫ) and conclude that QPE-bound ′ δ (ǫ * ) is true for some ǫ * ≥ 2 −2 q ′′′ (|G|+k) 2 . By the semantics of the formula QPE-bound δ (ǫ), we also have that QPE-bound δ (ǫ ′ ) is true for all positive ǫ ′ ≤ ǫ * , and the statement of the lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 10, part (2.) The proof is completely analogous to the proof of parts (1.) and (3.) . We use the algebraically defined functions H ǫ G : B → B ǫ , which are parametrized by an input variable ǫ. We "instantiate" ǫ with ǫ * = 2 −2 q ′′′ (|G|+k) 2 , where k = ⌈− log((δ/2) 2 )⌉. We know we can define ǫ * using an algebraic circuit having encoding size q ′′′ (|G| + k) 2 . We thus can construct an {+, −, * , /, max, min}-circuit C(x), having encoding size polynomial in |G| and size(δ), which defines the function H ǫ * G : B → B ǫ * on the domain B, and such that every fixed point of H ǫ * G is a ǫ * -QPE of G, which by Lemma 14 is also (δ/2)-close (in ℓ ∞ ) to an actual QPE. Thus, applying the triangle inequality, if we approximate a fixed point of H ǫ * G within ℓ ∞ distance (δ/2), we will have approximated a QPE of G within ℓ ∞ distance δ. This shows that δ-approximating a QPE, given G and given δ > 0, is in FIXP a .
5 Computing a δ-almost-NE, δ-almost-SGPE, δ-almost-ǫ-PE, and δ-almost-ǫ-QPE is PPAD-complete.
In this section we again exploit the functions F ǫ G (x) and H ǫ G (x), for a EFGPR, G, devised in Section 3 for ǫ-PEs and ǫ-QPEs. This time we do so in order to show that computing a δ-almost-ǫ-PE, given G and δ > 0 and ǫ > 0, is PPAD-complete. We also show that the notion of δ-almost-ǫ-PE suitably "refines" δ-almost-SGPE (and thus also δ-almost-NE), and that as a consequence computing a δ-almost-SGPE (or a δ-almost-NE), given G and given δ > 0, is PPAD-complete. Furthermore, we will show computing a δ-almost-ǫ-QPE, given G, and given δ > 0 and ǫ > 0 is PPAD-complete.
We have not yet actual defined the "almost" relaxation for QPE, which we call δ-almost-ǫ-QPE. We do so now: for δ ≥ 0, a behavior profile b ∈ B is called a δ-almost ǫ-quasi-perfect equilibrium (δ-almost-ǫ-QPE) of G, if it is (a): fully mixed, b ∈ B >0 , and (b): for all players i, all j ∈ [d i ], and all actions a, a
Note that when δ = 0 this definition is equivalent to ǫ-QPE (this is because for a fully mixed profile b,
. 25 Thus, our definition is a reasonable "almost" relaxation of ǫ-QPE.
We will make crucial use of some results and definitions from [10] , which we now recall. Note that the circuit defining F ǫ G (x) associates a function F ǫ G : B ǫ → B ǫ with each given pair G, ǫ , 25 In fact, as noted earlier, van Damme [38] defines QPE using the strict inequalities K j,a
where the rational value ǫ > 0 is given in binary as part of the input. 26 Thus |G| + size(ǫ) is the encoding size of the input from which the algebraic circuit for F ǫ G (x) is generated. Following [10] , we call the family of functions F ǫ G (x) { G,ǫ } , associated with input pairs G, ǫ , polynomially continuous in their domain B ǫ , if there is a polynomial q(z) such that for all input pairs G, ǫ , for every rational ǫ 1 > 0, there is a rational δ 1 > 0, such that size(δ 1 ) ≤ q(|G| + size(ǫ) + size(ǫ 1 )) and such that for all b, b ′ ∈ B ǫ :
Again following [10] , we call the family of functions F ǫ G (x) { G,ǫ } associated with input instances G, ǫ , polynomially computable if (a): the domain B ǫ of the functions F ǫ G : B ǫ → B ǫ is a convex polytope described by a set of linear inequalities with rational coefficients that can be computed from the input G, ǫ in polynomial time (note that this is clearly always the case for B ǫ , because ǫ > 0 is part of the input), and (b): there is a polynomial q(z) such that there is an algorithm that given G, ǫ , and given a rational vector b ∈ B ǫ , computes F ǫ G (b) (which is of course also a rational vector) in time q(|G| + size(ǫ) + size(b)). We need the following Lemma:
Lemma 15 The family of functions F ǫ G (x) { G,ǫ } for EFGPRs defined in Section 4 (equation (5)) is both (a.) polynomially computable and (b.) polynomially continuous.
(a.): First, we observe that the family of functions F ǫ G (x) { G,ǫ } for EFGPRs is polynomially computable. This follows easily from the definition of F ǫ G (x) given Section 4 and in equations (5) and (7). Specifically, given a rational vector b ∈ B ǫ , to compute F ǫ G (b), we must first compute a vector y :
is given by a polynomial in x whose encoding size, as a sum of multilinear monomials, is polynomial in |G| + size(ǫ). Note also that the encoding size of the resulting rational vector y is clearly polynomial in |G| + size(ǫ) + size(b). Next, having computed the vector y, we must sort each subvector y i,j , associated with agent (i, j), into a non-increasing sequence: z i,j = (z i,j,a 1 , z i,j,a 2 , . . . , z i,j,a |A i,j | ). We can clearly do so in P-time. Next, for each agent (i, j), we can clearly compute t i,j (b) in P-time using the simple {max, +} formula over the sorted vector of inputs z i,j given in equation (7). Finally, having computed t i,j (b) and y = h(b) in P-time, we have from equation (5) 
Thus we can compute F ǫ G (b) in time polynomial in |G| + size(ǫ) + size(b), given G, ǫ > 0, and any rational vector b ∈ B ǫ . (b.): Next, we want to show that the function family F ǫ G (x) { G,ǫ } for EFGPRs is polynomially continuous. We will in fact show that in the domain B ǫ the function F ǫ G (x) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 2 q(|G|+size(ǫ)) (with respect to the ℓ ∞ norm), for some polynomial q(·). In other words, for all b, b ′ ∈ B ǫ , we have:
Of course, it immediate follows from (9) is that the family of functions F ǫ G (x) { G,ǫ } is polynomially continuous: in the definition of polynomially continuity, take δ 1 := 1 2 q(|G|+size(ǫ)) · ǫ 1 , it then follows 26 In this section it will be more convenient to view the domain of the function F ǫ G as B ǫ , rather than B, because ǫ > 0 will be explicitly given.
Furthermore, clearly size(δ 1 ) ≤ q * (|G| + size(ǫ) + size(ǫ 1 )), for some fixed polynomial q * (·). So, we only need to establish (9) .
Consider any b,
. Moreover, we know by Proposition 2 that U i (x | π a i,j ) is given by an explicit polynomial (a weighted sum of multilinear monomials) in the variables x, with degree bounded by the height h G of the game tree T , and with encoding size polynomial in |G|.
First, consider any monomial for a suitable dimension d) , the monomial f (x) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant |α|k (with respect to the ℓ ∞ norm). To see this simple fact, note that for b, b ′ ∈ B ǫ , we have
The base case, k = 1, is trivial. For the inductive case, we have:
, and since max has Lipschitz constant 1, and since the sum of two Lipschitz functions with Lipschitz constant β 1 and β 2 is a Lipschitz function with Lipschitz constant ≤ β 1 + β 2 , we are done: there is a polynomial q(·) such that for
In fact, let us remark that Lemma 15 is a special case of a more general fact, namely that function families defined by {+, * , max, sort}-formulas whose encoding size is polynomial in the input instance, over a bounded domain such as B ǫ , are necessarily polynomially computable and polynomially continuous. The proof of the next lemma will argue this more explicitly.
Lemma 16
The family of functions H ǫ G (x) { G,ǫ } for EFGPRs defined in Section 4 (equation (6)) is both (a.) polynomially computable and (b.) polynomially continuous. . This is not only because the formula has only polynomial size, but also because, importantly, the special kind of {+, −, /, max, min, sort}-formula defining K j,a i (b), given in (4), has the property that the only occurrences of division in the formula occur when the denominator of the division operation evaluates to P b (I i,j ) for some information set I i,j . But the probability P b (I i,j ), for any b ∈ B ǫ is at least ǫ h G . Note that size(ǫ h G ) ≤ h G · size(ǫ). This ensures that the rational values arising as the result of such division gates in the formula for K The proof is again similar to the case F ǫ G (x). We noted already, after the proof of Lemma 15 , that an adaptation of that proof shows that any such function that can be defined by a {+, * , max, sort}-formula and has encoding size polynomial in |G| + size(ǫ) is polynomially continuous over the domain B ǫ . We will establish a more direct version of this fact here. H ǫ G (x) is defined by a {+, * , /, max, sort}-formula, meaning it also involves division. However, in the case of H ǫ G (x) we furthermore have the fact that the only use of division is inside subformulas which compute
, for some information set I i,j and some node u ∈ I i,j . Furthermore, we also see easily by inspection of H ǫ G (x) that, for all b ∈ B ǫ , and for every subformula f 1 (x) of the formula for H ǫ G (x), we have max b∈B ǫ |f 1 (b)| ≤ 2 q ′′ (|G|+size(ǫ)) for some fixed polynomial q ′′ (·) which is also independent of the subformula. We will use both of these facts. Now, for any two subformulas f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) of H ǫ G (x), suppose f 1 (x) (f 2 (x)) has Lipschitz constant β 1 (β 2 ), with respect to the ℓ ∞ norm, i.e., that for k ∈ {1, 2}, if for all b, b ′ ∈ B ǫ we have
has Lipschitz constant at most 2 q ′′ (|G|+size(ǫ)) · (β 1 + β 2 ). To see this, note that for all b, b ′ ∈ B ǫ we have:
(This is obvious.)
has Lipschitz constant at most max(β 1 , β 2 ). This follows immediately from the more general fact (established in the proof of Lemma 15) that the sort function has Lipschitz constant 1 (under the ℓ ∞ norm), since sort(y) 1 = max i y i . More directly (and repeating some the same arguments), we have:
To see why the first inequality holds, assume w.
Next, observe that for x in the domain B ǫ the functions
Px(I i,j ) have Lipschitz constant 2 q ′ (|G|+size(ǫ)) , for some fixed polynomial q ′ (·). This holds because for all i, j and u, and for all b, b ′ ∈ B ǫ , we have:
Thus, by induction on the size s of any subformula of f (x) of H ǫ G (x), which is either a {+, * , max, sort}-formula or of the form
is polynomially continuous over the domain B ǫ .
We now define a search problem called the almost fixed point approximation problem, called the weak (fixed point) approximation problem in [10] , specialized to the case of the fixed point functions F ǫ G : B ǫ → B ǫ . Namely, given as input G, ǫ , and a rational δ 1 > 0, compute a rational vector
We shall make crucial use of the following fact, which was established in [10] 2 (part 2.) ) If the family of fixed point functions F ǫ G (x) { G,ǫ } , associated with input instances G, ǫ , is polynomially continuous and polynomially computable, then the almost (weak) fixed point approximation problem for
The following Lemma is the key to this section:
Lemma 18 For any EFGPR, G, and ǫ > 0:
For any
δ > 0, if b ∈ B ǫ satisfies b − H ǫ G (b) ∞ < δ, then b is a (3 · δ)-almost-(δ + ǫ)-PE of G.
, ǫ)| ≤ δ implies the following, by case splitting based on the value of b i,j,a :
Thus, for all (i, j, a), we have U i (b | π a i,j ) ≤ t i,j (b) + 2 · δ, and for all (i, j, a) where , every "edge" of the game tree will have probability at least ǫ(G, δ). Thus already for every node u ∈ I i,j , P b ′ (u) ≥ ǫ(G, δ) h G , and so P b ′ (I i,j ) ≥ P b ′ (u) ≥ ǫ(G, δ) h G . Now note that, for any profile b ′ ∈ B ǫ(G,δ) , the expected payoff U i (b ′ ) can be expressed as a sum U i (b ′ ) = U . = (1 − P b ′ (I i,j )) denotes the probability of not reaching information set I i,j .
Note that, if in any such profile b ′ we change only the local strategy b ′ i,j to a new strategy b ′′ i,j then this does not effect the probabilities P b ′ (I i,j ) and P b ′ (¬I i,j ), nor does it effect the conditional expectation U ¬j i (b ′ ). In other words, for any behavior profile b ′ ∈ B ǫ(G,δ) and any local strategy b ′′ i,j ∈ B i,j , we have:
Now suppose, for contradiction, that for some π a ′ i,j , we have:
But then, by applying equation (11) with b ′ := (b | π a ′ i,j ) and b ′′ i,j := π a i,j , we have:
. But this contradicts inequality (10) . Thus, we must have
Again, let b ∈ B ǫ(G,δ) be a 
Proof.
The proof is by induction on m, using Claim 1, starting with base case m = 0.
Base case: For m = 0 consider an information set I i,j such that h F i j ≥ 0. This means that j is a leaf node in the directed information set forest F i . So, for any pure strategy π c i , suppose the local pure strategy (i.e., local action) chosen at I i,j within the pure strategy π c i is a ′ ∈ A i,j . Note that we then have U 
But then, for any a ′ ∈ A i,j , we have Thus
· δ, which completes the proof of the base case. 28 Inductive case: Assume the claim is true for m − 1 such that 0 ≤ m − 1 < h F i . We want to show it holds for m. Again, consider any pure strategy π c i for player i, and suppose that π c i (j) = a ′ . In other words, in information set I i,j , the action chosen by π c i is a ′ . Let J i (j, a ′ ) = {j ′ ∈ [d i ] | (j, a ′ , j ′ ) ∈ E F i } denote the set of children j ′ of j in the forest F i , such that the edge from j to j ′ is labeled by a ′ . (In other words, J i (j, a ′ ) denotes the information sets belonging to player i that could possibly be the next information set for that player which is reached, after reaching information set j.) For j ′ ∈ J i (j, a ′ ), let P i (b|π a ′ i,j ) (j ′ | j) denote the conditional probability of reaching information set I i,j ′ , conditioned on event of reaching information set I i,j and thereupon taking action a ′ ∈ A i,j , under profile b. Furthermore, let P i
denote the conditional probability of not reaching any information set in J i (j, a ′ ), conditioned on the event of reaching I i,j and thereupon taking action a ′ . Finally, let U j,¬J i (j,a ′ ) i (b | π a ′ i,j ) denote the conditional expected payoff (under profile b), conditioned on reaching I i,j and thereupon playing a ′ , but thereafter not reaching any information set in J i (j, a ′ ). Note that for all b ∈ B ǫ(G,δ) , and every a ′ ∈ A i,j , we have:
Note furthermore that:
(¬J i (j, a ′ ) | j). (13) We now use equation (13), the inductive hypothesis, and equation (12) , in order to establish that for any pure strategy π c i for player i, we have U 
Also observe that:
because this conditional expectation does not change when we change the strategy b i in local strategies (at J i (j, a ′ ) and below) which we have conditioned on not reaching. We thus have: Applying Lemma 18, Proposition 17, and Lemma 15, we obtain the main results of this section:
Theorem 19
EFGPRs. We believe this is a promising computational approach that should be implemented and explored experimentally.
